Download Free PDF. Robert Oprisko. A short summary of this paper. Download Download PDF. Translate PDF. Oprisko, Ph. The time has thus come to repeat Hegel. Zizek is both an attractive source of inspiration and an easy source for criticism, both of which have played an important role in the ongoing popularity and scathing criticism of his works.
A short summary of this paper. Download Download PDF. Translate PDF. And, of course, contra Kant, he is thereby claiming to know what Kant had denied we could possibly know. Others simply point to the fact that no one has succeeded in writing he Phenomenology of Spirit, Part Two. It is based on the adage that the second and third most pleasurable things in the world are the drink before and the cigarete ater.
In the simplest sense, we are talking about intentional consciousness, say in perception or empirical judgments, and the ontological status of agency. If it were it would be something like a mere complex registering and responding device of the same ontological status as a thermometer. I interrupt or negate merely positive being what I feel inclined to do, experience as wanting to do by deliberating and resolving what to do.
A tall order. Spontaneously mediated consciousness is the distinct being-at-work of human substance, its actualization. This will not be surprising to anyone who has read Tarrying with the Negative or he Parallax View. For in perceiving, I am also conscious of perceiving, conscious of myself perceiving. In believing anything, I am conscious of my believing, of myself commited to a belief.
In acting, I would not be acting, were I not conscious of myself acting. An action is not something that goes on whether I am conscious of it or not, like water boiling. It is only action if I am conscious of myself acting. Action is consciousness of action; there is no action unless I am conscious of myself acting.
I am not self-conscious in the way I am conscious of objects or an obvious regress would threaten. One could say that I am conscious of objects apperceptively or self-consciously; never that I am conscious of objects and also conscious of myself as a second object.
Or at least I am provisionally; I must also enact what I take myself to be or it is a mere confabulation or an untested pledge about what I will do. It seems clearly empirically false. But that is because the supposition concerns two acts, consciousness of the object and consciousness of the subject aware of the object, and the most important claim in the idealist treatment of the issue is that this is not so. Self-consciousness is not consciousness of an object.
But this path through German Idealism is the path he has chosen and it is important to know if his version is leading us correctly. I do not fully understand the claims about holes in the fabric of being, and at any rate, we do not need the claim if we go in the direction I am suggesting. For me to be conscious of my believing something is to be conscious of why I believe what I do however fragmentary, confused, or unknowingly inconsistent such reasons may be.
When I want to know what I believe, I am investigating what I ought to believe. In such a case, it is just a view I am entertaining, not what I believe.
Likewise with action. No gaps in being need apply; any more than the possibility of people playing bridge, following the norms of bridge and exploring strategies for winning need commit us to any unusual gappy ontology to account for the possibility of norm-responsive bridge following.
For, on this way of looking at the mater, there is no need for a paradoxical negative ontology. Of course, it is possible and important that some day researchers will discover why animals with human brains can do these things and animals without human brains cannot, and some combination of astrophysics and evolutionary theory will be able to explain why humans have ended up with the brains they have.
But these are not philosophical problems and they do not generate any philosophical problems. But this means that a consideration of being-in-its-intelligibility is the only sort of metaphysics that is possible to be is to be intelligible, something like the moto of Greek philosophy and so the beginning of philosophy.
But Fichte was quite clear on the diference and his remarks track closely the remarks made above about the status of the normative in Kant and the early idealists. A few examples will have to suice. It is this: reason is absolutely self-suicient; it exists only for itself.
But nothing exists for reason except reason itself. In short the Wissenschatslehre is transcendental idealism. But no transcendent guarantor is not the same thing as no possible reliance on reason in our own deliberations and in our claims on others.
Ressentiment is his reason, counted by him — in self-deceit — as warranting action, submission and moralistic condemnation of the Master; otherwise there would be no satisfaction in what he did. To claim something or to do something is to ofer to give reasons for the claim or the deed, and if there are reasons either to reject the reasons or to reject the claim of sincerity, we are still in, cannot exit, the space of reasons. Rather it is the right understanding of the other logically possible positions.
Philosophical materialism in all its forms — from scientific naturalism to Deleuzian New Materialism — has failed to meet the key theoretical and political challenges of the modern world. Recent history has seen developments. Parallax, or the change in the position of an object viewed along two different lines of sight and more precisely, the assumption that this adjustment is not only due to a change of focus, but a change in that object's ontological status has been a key philosophical concept throughout history.
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